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Abstract
Security and privacy in mobile ad-hoc peer-to-peer environments are hard to attain,
especially when working with passive objects (without own processing power, e.g.
RFID tags). This paper introduces a method for integrating such objects into a
peer-to-peer environment without infrastructure components while providing a high
level of privacy and security for peers interacting with objects. The integration is
done by associating public keys to passive objects, which can be used by peers to
validate proxies (peers additionally acting on behalf of objects). To overcome the
problem of limited storage capacity on small embedded objects, ECC keys are used.
1 Introduction
Currently, mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs[3]) are a highly active research
topic with many publications covering diﬀerent aspects of this inter-disciplinary
ﬁeld (e.g. [17]). These aspects include, but are certainly not limited to, hard-
ware (e.g. size, rugged design, power consumption, communication), software
(e.g. operating system/platform, communication protocols, memory usage),
interaction (e.g. interaction models, HCI aspects), security and application
issues. In this paper, we will focus on privacy and security aspects of ad-hoc,
peer-to-peer networks.
The SmartInteraction project is an approach to interact with persons,
things and places in a natural and non-obtrusive way. As for example people
meet each other, their “interaction proﬁle” is mutually compared in analogy
1 This work has been developed in cooperation with Siemens CT SE2, Munich
c©2003 Published by Elsevier Science B. V.
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to their natural, automatic choice of sympathy. Following the vastly suc-
cessful way of human interaction, the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) paradigm is used
for direct communication among all participating devices. This oﬀers com-
plete device autonomy, independence of central authorities and reliability due
to redundancy. Within the SmartInteraction project, this principle is even
taken one step further by also being independent of any common communica-
tion infrastructure: we utilize solely ad-hoc wireless networks, currently either
IEEE802.11b Wireless LAN (WLAN ) or IEEE802.15.1 Bluetooth (BT ). To
match the ﬂexibility of the P2P approach, local proﬁles describing the device
capabilities, user attributes and preferences are kept on every peer. Upon
spatial contact with other peers, these proﬁles provide the base for match-
ing user interests and determining further coordination. Additionally, context
constraints deﬁned in proﬁles provide the necessary context awareness for
ubiquitous applications; diﬀerent situations, identiﬁed by context parameters,
demand diﬀerent behavior. As in any ubiquitous system, privacy and secu-
rity are major concerns and are taken seriously by utilizing active and passive
privacy control backed by strong cryptography. This paper does not aim to
develop new cryptographic algorithms or novel security protocols, but instead
utilize and combine well-known and secure techniques. However, we were
unable to ﬁnd protocols or methods for securely integrating passive objects
without own processing capabilities into a P2P infrastructure. As this is an
issue in our project, it was necessary to develop a method to secure remote
proxies that act on behalf of passive objects; this is the main contribution in
the present work.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we start by shortly ex-
plaining the hard- and software environment the SmartInteraction project is
situated in, including our deﬁnition of (passive) objects. Section 3 then gives
an overview of related work, while section 4 presents our approach to P2P pri-
vacy and security between powerful peers. An improvement to this approach
to securely integrate (passive) objects with powerful peers – the main contri-
bution – is presented in section 5. After that, we give a short conclusion and
an outlook on our planned future research in section 6.
2 Environment
The SmartInteraction project aims to provide a ﬂexible framework for ad-
hoc, mobile P2P interaction of multiple, heterogeneous devices. A software
framework has been developed which handles many aspects of ad-hoc, P2P in-
teraction and therefore allows the eﬃcient construction of applications in this
fast-growing domain. This paper focuses on security aspects of the framework,
which is able to run on a wide range of platforms (peers); the only require-
ment is a Java 1.1 compatible JVM and arbitrary communication technology.
However, we also want to integrate devices without any processing capabilities
(objects) into the P2P interactions.
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2.1 Peers
For fully distributed, instantaneous, ad-hoc P2P interaction, processing capa-
bilities are required on each interaction partner. These so-called peers can run
our software framework, which allows them to discover and communicate with
each other. Possible platforms for peers are standard servers (especially for
remote proxy peers, described in the next section), notebooks, sub-notebooks,
handhelds, PDAs or even mobile phones. Small, mobile devices will normally
have limited resources such as processing power, RAM or storage capacity,
but they are nonetheless capable of securing their own communication with
strong cryptography (see appendix A).
2.2 Objects
As already mentioned, we do not want to restrict ourselves to only integrating
peers in the P2P interactions, but we also want to have objects participating.
In our environment, we deﬁne an object in the following way:
An object is passive with regards to to executing custom code, i.e. it does
not have processing power that could be exploited to run parts of a custom
software. Objects are required to have a unique identiﬁcation number (ID).
This deﬁnition does not exclude objects having a CPU and carrying out com-
putations. Thus, the following devices are examples for objects in our deﬁni-
tion:
• RFID (Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation tags [7]): These are either passive
(powered by the interrogator) or active (with own power supply), via RF
(Radio Frequency) accessible small memory devices, which are available for
a broad range of applications from multiple vendors like Identec Solutions,
Inside or Texas Instruments. An Identec iD-2 tag and the i-CARD PCMCIA
reader are shown in Fig. 1.
• IrDA (Infrared Data Association) beacons: These are active devices, peri-
odically sending infrared packets that can be received by any device with a
standard IrDA port (e.g. notebooks, PDAs, mobile phones). IrDA beacons
have already been deployed on larger scale for various applications (e.g.
[19]).
• Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15) devices: There already exist many Bluetooth de-
vices with own processing power which could be peers in our deﬁnition.
But even Bluetooth devices without own processing power can be used as
objects by utilizing their MAC address as unique object ID.
As those devices, especially the RFID tag technology, become smaller with
each generation, embedding them into real-world objects (e.g. food packag-
ing, clothes 2 , books, posters, doors or any other tangibles 3 ) allows those
2 Benetton recently adopted Philips RFID technology for ’smart’ labels
3 Tangible interfaces try to give physical form to digital information[10].
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real-world objects to take part in interactions within the SmartInteraction
project, creating a digital representation of the real-world object. This digital
representation can accomplish any appropriate task to support the real-world
interaction, e.g. oﬀering detailed information on food nutrition or allowing
to place reviews on a book borrowed from a public library. There are two
possibilities for integrating objects into a P2P interaction environment that
allow peers to interact with objects:
• Local proxies: One possibility is to keep the actual data on the objects
themselves (e.g. on a RFID tag’s custom data storage area) and process it
on the peers that wish to interact with the objects. On the peers, a wrapper
acts as local proxy for the object, performing all computations and possibly
also modifying the data on the object.
The obvious disadvantage is that a wrapper for each type of application
and type of object must be installed on each peer that wishes to interact
with those objects. Furthermore, Securing objects is virtually impossible
when peers are allowed to modify the object’s data (e.g. posting reviews on
a book), because the objects themselves, having no processing capabilities,
are unable to control access to that data.
• Remote proxies: The other possibility is to only keep a unique ID on the
object itself and set up remote proxy peers that act on behalf of the objects.
When detecting an object, an ordinary peer will store its ID and try to
ﬁnd a peer which represents that object, i.e. which is a remote proxy peer
for this ID (synchronous proxy interaction). When no peer currently in
range claims to be responsible for the object ID, it will start the interaction
as soon as one becomes available (asynchronous proxy interaction). This
allows very ﬂexible interaction patterns between peers and objects (repre-
sented by proxy peers) because the proxy can be arbitrarily complex. More
importantly, we are able to guarantee object privacy and security with this
scheme, which is our main contribution in this paper. We would like to
point out that the distinction between an ordinary peer and a proxy peer
only stems from the applications running on them; the underlying frame-
work is equivalent on both, the proxy peer just declares to be responsible
for certain object IDs. The diﬀerent terms are only used to distinguish both
sides of a P2P communication in protocol explanations.
However, the disadvantage is that an additional peer is needed for the in-
teraction. For some applications, a hybrid scheme may be appropriate:
read-only data could be stored directly on the object to communicate ﬁrst
information and a remote proxy could be available for further, more ﬂexible
interaction.
For the SmartInteraction project, we decided that the ﬂexibility and security
of the remote proxy approach outweighs the disadvantage. Therefore, in the
remainder of the paper we will only talk about this method.
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(a) iD-2 (b) i-CARD
Figure 1. Identec RFID hardware
3 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to bring up the topic
of securely integrating passive objects in an ad-hoc, P2P environment.
Like Frank Stajano pointed out, it is not possible to provide a certiﬁcate
authority (an online server for all peers) for authentication in a highly dy-
namical, ad-hoc P2P environment[18, pages 85ﬀ]. Additionally, he suggests
to exchange all information which is needed for security measures (certiﬁcates,
keys) during the bootstrap phase like our system does[18, pages 91ﬀ].
The Freenet project[2] was probably one of the ﬁrst projects to integrate
high-standard privacy and security in a completely distributed P2P architec-
ture.
Marc Langheinrich described a privacy awareness system integrated into
an ubiquitous computing environment[13], building on the P3P standard by
the W3C (World Wide Web Consortium). The diﬀerence to our system is that
it depends on infrastructure components whereas our approach is completely
based on the P2P paradigm.
The W3C published another recommendation for implementing XML sig-
natures[5] that provide integrity, message authentication and signer authenti-
cation for data of any type.
Additionally, there are numerous papers about security measures for RFID
technology, which focus on the physical layers[16] (e.g. preventing denial-of-
service attacks). Security in sensor networks is currently also a very active
research topic (e.g. [15]).
This paper builds upon well-known methods, but integrates passive ob-
jects into a fully distributed P2P security concept, which diﬀerentiates it from
previous publications.
109
Mayrhofer et al
4 Privacy and Security in mobile ad-hoc networks
4.1 Motivation
For pervasive computing environments in general, security is an important
issue because the possibilities for attacks are enormous. Mobile devices like
notebooks, PDAs or mobile phones usually carry important data like the user’s
phone numbers, calendar, notes and other private data (cf. [18]). Following
the Code of Fair Information Practices (FIPs)[8], any information processing
system (mobile ad-hoc P2P systems are in essence only information processing
systems) must assure the reliability of data and prevent misuse (principle 5:
security). In addition to ensuring this required data security and reliability,
our privacy control addresses principle 1 (openness) and partially principle 3
(secondary usage) with our concept of active privacy. Principles 2 (disclosure)
and 4 (correction) require organizational precautions in our environment and
are thus not covered by this technical solution.
The core objective in this approach is to provide a high level of privacy
and data security to the users of mobile, ad-hoc P2P systems, not the secure
authentication of users to infrastructure components or any other application
that is not focused on the user’s own privacy. Therefore, all decisions and
policies concerning privacy and security should be local to the respective peers
that participate in some secure environments.
Basically, there are two diﬀerent aspects of privacy from the user’s point
of view, to be tackled with two diﬀerent privacy policies:
• ”Passive” privacy: The goal is to shield the user from incoming information
and only present desired messages. As we are all inundated with infor-
mation, protection has become a necessity. By means of proﬁle matching
(to match interests and preferences), the SmartInteraction Framework al-
ready provides good shielding to the user, but it can be enhanced by using
authentication information in the shielding process.
• ”Active” privacy: The goal is to ﬁlter outgoing information and only allow
non-private information to leave the peer. One possibility to implement it
is to allow a ﬁne-grained deﬁnition of ”access control” in the local peer’s
proﬁles and to use authentication information to determine the level of trust
in other peers.
In this paper, by the term ”privacy control”, we describe the active software
component that actually makes the decisions on active and passive privacy - it
determines which messages are allowed to be sent or received. With the term
”privacy policy”, we describe the set of rules and preferences a user deﬁned
for the mobile device - they will be enforced by the privacy control.
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4.2 Peer-to-Peer Security
Communication between ordinary peers is based on XML-messages. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to secure those. This is accomplished with a hybrid
system similar in design to PGP which uses both symmetrical (with session
keys) and asymmetrical encryption (with private/public key pairs) and digital
signatures for authentication.
Our current architecture uses well-known techniques, featuring a very high
privacy and security level while operating in an ad-hoc P2P environment and
retaining maximum autonomy of peers:
• Use of hybrid encryption.
Symmetric encryption: To comply with the current best practices,
it is advisable to use Rijndael, the AES winning cipher, as the symmetric
cipher: it is secure, well-analyzed and fast (the speed penalty compared to
RC6 is tolerable, cf. table A.1). In this document, Rijndael will simply be
named AES. However, there are some doubts on the security of Rijndael[4],
which are currently only theoretical. AES ciphers have a block size of 128
Bit and possible key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 Bit, but some (including
Rijndael) are capable to use keys with a higher length (and can therefore
be adapted to a higher security level).
Asymmetric key management:
· RSA: RSA has the main advantage that it can be used for creating digital
signatures as well as for asymmetric encryption, requiring only one keypair
for each role.
· EC ElGamal/ECDSA: Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) variant of the
ElGamal key exchange algorithm. ECC keys oﬀer the same level of secu-
rity as other methods with signiﬁcantly smaller key sizes[14] (e.g. 163-bit
ECC in contrast to 1024-bit RSA). However, it seems to be generally
slower.
Digest generation: For computing digests of messages, the standard
SHA256 algorithm is used. Digests are generally created over the whole
XML message and then signed with the private key associated to the re-
spective role that sent the message.
• Use of the X.509v3 standard for issuing and validating certiﬁcates.
For proving the authenticity of (public) keys and their association to roles,
certiﬁcates are needed. These certiﬁcates are issued by certiﬁcate authori-
ties (CAs) and bind the public key to the role description, digitally signed
by the private key of the CA. For mutually authenticating peers that do
not know each other directly, certiﬁcates seem the best option. However,
since a single, hierarchical PKI poses many security risks[6], we opt to not
depend on one. Instead, we will utilize multiple, independent CAs that
are completely autonomous (there will be no hierarchical structure between
CAs) as well as webs of trust between users.
X.509v3[9] is a well-established standard for certiﬁcate formats and is, among
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others, used for SSL/TLS and S/MIME. Therefore, it is used far more of-
ten than OpenPGP as a mere certiﬁcation standard (outside the domain
of email and Usenet net news). There are various free implementations for
handling X.509v3 certiﬁcates (e.g. OpenSSL, SUN Java JSSE), including
Java libraries. The main advantage of X.509v3 is the possibility to deﬁne
arbitrary ﬁelds in the certiﬁcate, which can be used to add meta-data (e.g.
adding the department in addition to the company name). Although this is
also possible with OpenPGP, it would need to be done application-speciﬁc –
X.509v3 oﬀers this in its standard form. Additionally, X.509 supports Cer-
tiﬁcate Revocation Lists
· Certiﬁcates can be issued by multiple CAs and each device can store
multiple independent certiﬁcates for the diﬀerent roles of its user.
· Key pairs, role certiﬁcates and CA certiﬁcates are transferred to the device
in a bootstrap phase.
· Certiﬁcates are exchanged between peers before actual data is transferred.
When an ordinary peer wants to use authentication or encryption to
communicate with another peer, both have to exchange their proﬁles.
Therefore, certiﬁcates are automatically embedded in the ﬁrst message
(cf. Fig. 4, step 5).
• All veriﬁcation, validation and authentication decisions are made locally
and autonomously by each peer. In a mobile P2P environment we can not
rely on an infrastructure with central servers that are constantly available;
thus the devices are forced to be completely autonomous. This not only
enhances the privacy of users by keeping important decisions local, but also
allows to produce a detailed log of which personal data was sent to whom.
Although our current work concentrates mostly on mutual authentication of
peers via certiﬁcates, signed and encrypted messages, the privacy control
should be able to intervene with all parts of the framework. One example
would be to completely turn oﬀ the radios of all wireless communication chan-
nels on the hardware layer, becoming fully invisible to other peers.
5 Integration of objects
5.1 Problem description
When trying to integrate passive objects (according to our deﬁnition in sec-
tion 2.2) into a security infrastructure, a number of problems arise. The main
cause is that an object is, due to not having any processing power, unable to
perform any authentication – neither authenticating itself nor verifying the
authenticity of other peers. In Fig. 2, the interaction with an object is de-
picted. After detecting an object O in range, the ordinary peer A will search
for a proxy peer B which claims to be responsible for O. Because no direct
interaction between O and A is possible (A can only detect O and read it’s ID
and possibly some custom data), all authentication will need to be performed
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Figure 2. Communication between an ordinary peer and an object via a remote
proxy
between A and B. As already mentioned in the architecture description, we
can not depend on a single trusted third party like a CA to certify A and B
and therefore the validity of B’s responsibility for O. In real-world scenarios
it will be virtually impossible to pre-authenticate A and B (without a single
trusted third party) via a web of trust. Thus, it would be possible for an
attacker E to claim responsibility for objects (by setting up a remote proxy
for the respective IDs) she/he doesn’t own, opening up a number of security
threats such as:
• Interception of data: When A tries to send private data O, E could easily
intercept this data by pretending to be a valid proxy for the respective
object.
• Forgery of data: E could send forged data to A, pretending to be legitimately
representing O and thus exploiting A’s possible trust in O.
• Tracking of users: E could construct a proxy peer claiming to be responsi-
ble for all objects in some geographical area and capturing and logging all
communication requests. Since ordinary peers will try to contact proxies
when interacting with objects, they will also contact E as pretended proxy.
E can then track the movement of peers in the geographical area, which
can be seen as a severe threat to the privacy of ordinary peers (cf. [16,
section 4.1]).
A has, in this situation, no possibility to distinguish between the claims of B
and E as depicted in Fig. 2.
In the following, we present a solution to these privacy threats. However,
due to the nature of our project environment, it is inherently impossible (on
this level) to prevent against one additional threat, which we also want to
describe: An attacker could place an object P (or multiple objects) and a cor-
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Figure 3. Secured communication between an ordinary peer and an object via a
remote proxy
rectly associated proxy peer E in spatial proximity to the real object, gaining
a reasonable chance that ordinary peers will ﬁnd P instead of O and thus con-
tact E instead of B. This “physical attack” can not be overcome with software
tools (cf. [18]). However, this sort of attack can successfully be prevented by
using certiﬁcates to authenticate B, as described in section 4.2. A can then
validate the authenticity of B and thus refuse to connect to E when it does
not provide a valid, accepted certiﬁcate.
Finally, we want to note that it is not necessary to protect against mali-
cious ordinary peers on this level. When the proxy peer is trusted, attacks
by ordinary peers can also be inhibited using the techniques described in sec-
tion 4.2.
5.2 Solution
Our proposed solution is to store a public key on the object itself, and the
associated private key on the proxy peer that is responsible for interacting on
behalf of the object. As depicted in Fig. 3, O stores a public key in addition
to its ID. This key is either an EC (elliptic curve) or RSA key, depending
on the available storage area for custom data. The reason for choosing EC
ElGamal/ECDSA[12,1] as asymmetric algorithms is that keys with a signiﬁ-
cantly smaller size oﬀer the same level of security, compared with RSA. On the
Identec i-D2 active RFID tags, there are only 64 Bytes available for storing
the public key. Table 1 lists the sizes (in Bytes) of public keys in (binary)
DER[11] encoding, generated with the openssl library 4 . When using 160 Bit
4 The openssl cryptographic library oﬀers a wide range of symmetrical and asymmetrical
algorithms, including certiﬁcate authority functionality, and a command line interface for
accessing them. It is freely available at http://www.openssl.org/.
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Algorithm Parameters Key size
RSA 1024 Bit modulus 162
DSA 1024 Bit prime 442
EC secp160r2 curve 64
Table 1
Public key sizes
Figure 4. Initiating an interaction between a peer and an object via a remote proxy
prime ﬁelds for EC, which is considered to be comparably secure as using a
1024 Bit long modulus for RSA (e.g. [14]), the public key will ﬁt perfectly
into the objects’s custom storage area, even in a standard encoding format. If
more storage is available on the used object technology, standard RSA public
keys can be used for better run-time performance.
The respective private key (regarding the public key stored on O) belongs
to B and is kept there. When reading objects in range, A stores all public
keys in an internal table, associating them with the object IDs from which
the public keys were read. This table then allows A to decide locally and
autonomously if a proxy peer that claims to be responsible for O is valid.
Protocol description
• All messages from an ordinary peer to a proxy peer (from A to B) are AES-
encrypted with a temporary session key. Using the public key from the
internal table (the public key stored on O), A can send the session key to
B utilizing either EC ElGamal or RSA.
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• All messages from a proxy peer to an ordinary peer (from B to A) are signed,
either with ECDSA or RSA using the private key stored on B. A can then
verify all messages received from B for integrity and validity using the public
key from its internal table. This includes the announcement messages (cf.
Fig. 4, step 2) sent by B. Thus, E can not send messages that A considers as
valid, not even the announcement message where E claims to be responsible
for O.
• Further security measures to obviate other attacks can be applied one pro-
tocol level higher. On this level, the communication is transparent to both
involved peers and can thus be handled as it would be between two ordinary
peers, including the use of certiﬁcates for authentication. Our protocol on
this level is shown in Fig. 4:
Step 1 An ordinary peer A ﬁnds passive objects (AB1, AB2 and CE1) and stores
their IDs and public keys (EC ElGamal/ECDSA or RSA) in a local table.
Step 2 Proxy peer B sends a signed advertisement to A where it claims respon-
sibility for a set of passive objects (AB*).
Step 3 A compares the advertisement with the entries in the local table and
reports successful matches (AB1 and AB2) to B, thus notifying the proxy
application of the actual object IDs it should act for.
Step 4 Exchange of all needed certiﬁcates between A and B (with RSA keys).
Step 5 Finally, secure communication between A and B on behalf of AB1 and AB2
is possible. Messages are fully signed and encrypted in both directions,
using the RSA keys from the exchanged certiﬁcates (equivalent to normal
interaction between ordinary peers).
It is important to note that B does never send a cryptographic key (neither
a temporary, symmetric session key nor an asymmetric public key) to A until
the certiﬁcate exchange; A either generates the key (the session key for AES
encryption) or uses the public key that was read from the object, fulﬁlling our
requirement of autonomy. Thus, it is impossible for E to spoof messages from
O and to read messages destined for O. However, this holds true only if two
assumptions are fulﬁlled:
• The private key belonging to the public key stored on O is only stored
on B and kept safe. As this is a standard requirement for the usage of
private keys, it is a matter of physical security of B. In a typical scenario,
the remote proxy peers will either run on trusted embedded devices or on
tightly controlled servers, allowing to secure the key.
• The public key stored on O can not be changed by E. This is usually guar-
anteed with read-only objects that can be written only once (e.g. fuses in
RFID tags) or by password-protected write access to the objects. Practi-
cally, this places no restriction on the possible scenarios because only the
physical object needs to be read-only, not its virtual counterpart (repre-
sented by the remote proxy). With the virtual representation in the P2P
environment, any interaction is possible, including operations that modify
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data on the remote proxy, associated with the physical object.
We want to point out that this solution will not be able to provide complete
privacy and security on its own, it has to be seen as an addition to the standard
methods described in section 4.2. However, without an addition, a secure
integration of objects as deﬁned in section 2.2 does not seem to be possible.
When both layers (as laid out in this paper) are used, we are now able to
provide a high level of privacy and security, even in this diﬃcult environment.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have introduced a method to securely integrate passive objects (basically
re-sourceless peers with a unique identiﬁcation number) into an ad-hoc P2P
environment. After introducing the SmartInteraction project and deﬁning the
term ”object” in the context of this project, a method for transparently inter-
acting with objects which do not have their own processing power has been
given; the most ﬂexible approach for such an interaction is via remote prox-
ies that act on behalf of the objects and are themselves peers. The problem
with this kind of interaction via a remote proxy peer (responsible for a list of
objects identiﬁed by their ID) is that three parties are involved in the authen-
tication process: the object, the ordinary peer (which seeks to interact with
the object) and the proxy peer (which diﬀerentiates itself from an ordinary
peer only by claiming responsibility for objects). Because the object does not
have the ability to actively participate in the authentication process, the or-
dinary peer must use locally available information to verify the authenticity
of all proxy peers that claim to be responsible for the object. Our solution
in the SmartInteraction project is to put public keys directly on the objects,
which must be read-only to ordinary peers. With this technique, an attacker
can no longer spoof responsibility for an object.
We have also shown by empirical performance evaluation that strong en-
cryption is possible even on thin client technology (like PDAs), giving rise for
using standard cryptographic algorithms. A proof-of-concept implementation
of our methods and protocols is available, formal veriﬁcation of the protocol
still has to be done.
As a next step, we will work on another important aspect of privacy and
security on mobile devices: conﬁguration by end-users. Because the privacy
and security component is very ﬂexible, there are also many aspects that
can be conﬁgured (e.g. details on certiﬁcate validity checks). End-users will
generally be unaware of those aspects and unable to set them properly, not
knowing about the consequences of each. We will perform a ﬁeld study to
measure the actual usage of certain privacy and security features; this will be
possible after the privacy and security module has been completely integrated
into a new demonstration application, which will be presented in more detail
in future work.
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A Performance evaluation
Before deﬁning an architecture that fulﬁlls our requirements, we have to study
which techniques are feasible on the described devices. The performance data
was obtained on an Athlon 1,8 GHz PC, on a Fujitsu-Siemens Pocket Loox
(with a 400 MHz XScale ARM processor and 64 MB RAM) and on a Compaq
Ipaq 3870 (with a 206 MHz StrongARM processor and 64 MB RAM) with
a small test program utilizing the freely available BouncyCastle Java cryp-
tography library 5 . Table A.1 should only give an overview as the current
implementation is not optimized for performance. Additionally, these values
also include some processor time for console output, which is slow on Pocket-
PCs (without performance output, the test program should be faster). On the
PC, 5 test runs were done to obtain the average values while on the PocketPCs
10 test runs were performed. All values are in milliseconds (ms).
5 The library, including API documentation, can be downloaded freely from
http://www.bouncycastle.org/
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Symmetric encryption and decryption as well as digest generation were per-
formed on a typical XML message, which had a size of 1768 Byte. Asymmetric
signatures and RSA encryption were performed on the 256 Bit digest gener-
ated from that message. Key lengths were 128 Bit for symmetric and 1024 Bit
respectively 163 Bit for asymmetric encryption. These tests should reﬂect the
typical operations. For EC, we could only test the ECDSA (signature gen-
eration and veriﬁcation) part, because there seems to be no implementation
of EC ElGamal available at the moment. We will implement EC ElGamal
with BouncyCastly and make it publically available as the SmartInteraction
project progresses. The higher variance in the PC test runs can be explained
by concurrently running programs.
As can be seen from table A.1, high security encryption and signatures are
possible on current PDAs – a typical message can be encrypted with AES/RSA
and signed in less than 1300 ms and decrypted and veriﬁed in less than 1200
ms. The high values for generation of RSA key pairs do not inﬂuence the
intended security architecture because keys would be generated on more pow-
erful external systems and transferred to the mobile devices in a bootstrap
phase. However, on the PocketPC platform, EC operations (signature gener-
ation and veriﬁcation) take signiﬁcantly longer than their RSA counterparts,
most probably because of a weak ﬂoating point unit; on the PC, EC signature
generation and veriﬁcation have a run-time comparable to RSA. Currently,
we will use RSA as asymmetric algorithm whenever possible and only employ
EC when key size is the limiting factor.
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AES: init. for encr. 3 0,00 172 60,48 200,5 70,73
AES: encryption 20 15,53 402,7 115,21 479,6 86,50
AES: init. for decr. 2,2 0,98 72,3 39,03 167,9 97,12
AES: decryption 24,2 16,17 493,3 151,47 373,9 116,43
RC6: init. for encr. 3,8 3,60 90 36,52 218,4 146,83
RC6: encryption 6,6 0,80 215,8 87,14 447,5 163,96
RC6: init. for decr. 2,4 0,80 48,2 8,85 161,4 48,42
RC6: decryption 13,8 16,12 258,8 68,48 377,1 62,92
SHA256: digest 16,4 4,84 306,9 101,76 770,3 507,15
RSA: param. gen. 2,4 0,49 85,3 123,31 45,5 49,47
RSA: keypair gen. 3057,8 2375,87 10328,5 5043,77 15886,8 7164,11
RSA: signature gen. 73,8 16,23 360,2 19,84 421,6 115,54
RSA: signature verify 2,2 0,40 142,5 27,49 187,8 71,58
RSA: init. for encr. 4,4 4,32 4,8 1,17 3,5 0,50
RSA: encryption 6 8,00 34,6 4,80 151,8 39,21
RSA: init. for decr. 2,6 0,80 4,6 0,49 392,6 85,01
RSA: decryption 48 16,98 123,5 2,46 254,3 30,51
EC param. gen. 9,4 4,59 748,6 154,57 514 60,37
EC keypair gen. 61,2 22,48 9194,2 453,19 5998,2 492,87
EC signature gen. 35,8 8,61 8959,3 444,01 6622 378,30
EC signature verify 51,6 4,22 17138 769,20 11389,6 667,37
Table A.1
Performance measurements
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